Gentrification, Gun Violence, and Coordination
Failure
Zachary Porreca∗
West Virginia University
September 2021

Abstract
In this study, I demonstrate the causal linkage between gentrification
and gun violence. I develop a theoretical model of competition in the
unregulated illegal drug market, and draw the conclusion that violence in
the market is, in part, caused by the officially unenforceable nature of territorial claims. Exogenous shocks, such as gentrification, keep viable territory in a state of constant flux, preventing sustained cooperation between
these illegal actors. I then specify a two-way fixed effects differences-indifferences estimator to empirically test the model’s prediction that the
gentrification of one block will lead to increases in violence across the surrounding neighborhood. I find a robust result, that some 5,800 (21%) of
Philadelphia’s shootings over the decade of this study’s window can be
attributed to spillover effects from gentrification. This effect is nearly ten
times stronger, when it is a high drug crime block that gentrifies. This
study further contributes a new easily replicable empirical measurement
of gentrification drawn primarily from property sales, along with building, zoning, and alteration permit issuance. This new measurement is
able to capture gentrification at its finest and most realistic resolution:
the individual block level.
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Introduction

On the night of February 21, 2019 a shootout erupted on the corner of 4th
and West Huntington Streets in a section of North Philadelphia infamous for
its open-air heroin markets: a neighborhood known locally as the “Badlands”.
Some 25 shots rang out from at least two shooters. As those shooters fled,
a teenager was left dead on the sidewalk, having suffered multiple gunshot
wounds1 .
A few blocks over, a large construction project was underway. Nine brand
new three and four story triplexes were being built by an out-of-town developer,
completely changing the face and character of the neighborhood surrounding the
corner of Front and West Huntington Streets. The gentrification of this rundown residential neighborhood was well underway.
In this study, I demonstrate the causal linkage between gentrification and gun
violence. I develop a theoretical model of competition in the unregulated illegal
drug market, and draw the conclusion that violence in the market is, in part,
caused by the officially unenforceable nature of territorial claims. Exogenous
shocks, such as gentrification, keep viable territory in a state of constant flux,
preventing sustained cooperation between these illegal actors.
I then specify a two-way fixed effects differences-in-differences estimator to
empirically test the model’s prediction that the gentrification of one block will
lead to increases in violence across the surrounding neighborhood. I find a robust
result showing that on average gentrification increases levels of gun violence on
neighbor blocks. This effect is more pronounced when the gentrified block has
a history of drug crime, with an average increase of nearly nine shootings in
the surrounding neighborhood. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that
roughly 5,800 shootings, or 21% of the city’s shootings across the ten year study
1 From 6ABC Philadelphia.
killed-teenager/5150764/

https://6abc.com/philadelphia-kensington-shooting-teen-
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window can be attributed to spillover effects from gentrification.
This study further contributes a new easily replicable empirical measurement of gentrification drawn primarily from property sales along with building,
zoning, and alteration permit issuance. This new measurement is able to capture gentrification at its finest and most realistic resolution: the individual block
level.
That a relationship between gentrification and crime exists is not a new
revelation. O’Sullivan (2005) provided a theoretical model positing a causal
relationship between exogenously falling crime rates and an influx of higher
income residents. The author went further, to assert that gentrification is selfreinforcing in that the influx of higher income residents will further decrease
crime rates, which further incentives an even greater displacement of low income
residents in favor of those with a higher income. Similarly, Ellen et al. (2019)
found that reductions in crime rates invite increases in rates of wealthy and
educated residents moving into the central city.
Numerous authors have attempted to look the other direction at the effect
that gentrification has on crime. Papachristos et al. (2011) regressed homicide
and robbery rates on Chicago neighborhood demographic factors drawn from
census data, along with a novel proxy for gentrification: the number of coffee
shops in a neighborhood. The authors found that their markers of gentrification were associated with declining homicide rates, but increasing robbery rates.
Smith (2012) utilized a similar approach, regressing gang related homicides on
census provided neighborhood demographic factors, coffee shops, and an indicator for the demolition of public housing. The author finds decreases in homicides
as markers of gentrification grow more prevalent. More recently, Autor et al.
(2017) found that rapid gentrification precipitated by the end of rent control in
Cambridge, Massachusetts led to significant decreases in the overall crime rate.
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This study employs a different approach. Neighborhood, census tract, or
other artificially drawn borders and boundaries do not necessarily capture the
reality of a city. A city is a collection of streets, the lattice-work of their intersections creating the individual blocks that serve as the base level points from
which change across a city can be observed. Violence, gentrification, and crime
begin as extremely localized phenomena. As such, this study examines block
level variation in relevant markers and adopts a quasi-experimental approach:
taking block level gentrification as an exogenous treatment so as to allow causal
inferences to be made regarding the effect that gentrification has on gun violence.
This study seeks to explain a counter-intuitive result that runs against the
major current of gentrification and crime related literature. Gentrification does
not impose a positive externality on the surrounding community in regards to
gun violence. Instead, these spikes in new real estate interest push violence outward and into the surrounding neighborhood Much of this increase in violence
is the result of competition in the illegal drug markets that exist within pockets
of the urban environment. The peculiarities of this sort of competition have
been largely unexamined in the literature.
Skaperdas (2001), Varese (2010), and Skarbek (2016) have all posited similarly that organized criminal governance can only arise in the vacuum of official
forms of governance. However, the presence of such a vacuum does not guarantee that such an organized outcome will arise. Skaperdas (2001) posits a reason
for the failure to coordinate: that criminal competition more closely resembles
an ”arms race”, where market share can be taken through violent means that
decrease overall market welfare. It this proposition that this study provides
theoretical and empirical backing to.
This study seeks to together explain both the reasons why what is a seeming
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improvement to an area is able to cause increases in violence and why an unregulated market so violently fails to give rise to coordination among competitors.
This study posits that the failure to coordinate strategies in this competitive
environment is a product of the ability of a firm to gain market share through
aggressive and militaristic tactics. The likelihood that all firms across a market
should elect not to engage in such strategies decreases as the size of the market to be competed for decreases. Exogenous shocks such as gentrification are
responsible for this market concentration and give rise to the increases in gun
violence observed.
Several other recent studies have taken a similar approach in examining spatial dimensions of competition among criminal organizations. DeAngelo (2012)
builds a theoretical model of spatial competition, and with this model predicts
that increases in law enforcement can deter lower productivity criminals’ entrance into the market. Sobrino (2019) examines Mexican drug cartel violence
as a competition for control over lucrative territory. She finds empirically that
violence coincided with the entrance of additional cartels into a municipality.
Castillo et al. (2020) also examines Mexican cartel violence, modeling municipal
level competition as a contest for revenue. They find that scarcity caused by
cocaine seizures led to significant increases in levels of violence. Bruhn (2021)
examines gang presence across the city of Chicago. He finds that as a gang enters new territory, levels of crime (including violent crime) in that area increase.
While these studies focus on the entrance and exit of competitors and the impact of supply shocks on the illegal market, this study documents the impact
that the lack of officially enforceable territorial claims has on the dynamics of
competition.
The model developed in this study builds upon the more common models
of tacit collusion in price competition by the inclusion of a contest function
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to determine each organization’s latent market share. These market shares
can be directly influenced by an organization’s choice of strategy, as criminal
organizations have the additional option to utilize violent force to expand a
share of the market. The inclusion of violence or military capacity in a contest
function is not a new contribution. Hirshleifer (1989), Skaperdas (1992), Polo
(1995), and Skaperdas (1996) have well established these foundations. Collusion
on a strategy space that allows for violent conflict and this market dynamic’s
implications for urban gentrification are novel contributions.
This study offers both theoretical and empirical evidence for the cause of
criminal firms’ failure to collude, which is in turn posited to be the mechanism
by which gentrification causes increases in violence.

2

Theory and Model

The markets for illegal goods are notably absent formal regulation. There is no
protection of property rights and no legal enforcement of contracts or territorial claims. This unregulated market allows criminal organizations to compete
for profit both through the traditional vehicles of price and quantity as well
as through competitive strategies that are unparalleled in traditional market
dynamics. The forcible seizure of a rival’s assets or territory is a very real
possibility.
To set the framework for this model, the illegal drug market is modeled by
an infinitely repeated price competition among N organizations. For simplicity,
I will assume a homogeneous product. Some exogenous history has determined
the current division of of the market, which is represented by a contest function:
Si =

η
Pi
ηi + N
j6=i ηj

=

ki
k

Where ηi can be thought of as the defensive effort or reputational advantage
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needed to maintain an organization’s existing position. This market is overlaid
over a structure of k city blocks, which for simplicity I will assume are all
equally productive. As such, an organization’s market share is equal to the
fraction of total blocks that are under that organization’s control.
Demand is linear and negatively sloping in price. All organization’s face the
same constant marginal cost and no fixed cost.
Thus, the profit function of firm i is equal to:
πi = (p − c)(a − bp)( η

η
PiN

i+

j6=i

ηj

)

When these organizations fail to coordinate on prices, competition drives
prices down to marginal cost. Coordination, however, can allow overall market
revenue to be maximized by colluding on the monopoly price, pm =

a−Q
b .

This

allows each organization to earn a higher profit, πim .
By deviating from this cooperative strategy and offering a price marginally
lower than pm , namely p∗ = pm − , the non-cooperative organization is able
to serve the entirety of the market demand, earning all of the market profit.
The profit of the deviating firm will be:
πi∗ = (p∗ − c)(a − bp∗ )
The profit of all other firms will be zero. In this simple case, the other
organizations can retaliate against the deviating organization by dropping prices
down to marginal cost and in turn driving market profits to zero.
Thus, collusion at this monopoly price is only sustainable as long as the
following condition holds:
1
πim ( 1−δ
) ≥ πi∗ ∀i ∈ [1, ...., N ]
i

Where: δi is the discount factor for organization i; a measure of that
organization’s ”impatience” in discounting future earnings
As such, collusion at that price is only possible when the following condition
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holds:
δi ≥ 1 − ( η

η
PiN

i+

j6=i

ηj

) ∀i ∈ [1, ...., N ]

This is the basic model of collusion in price competing markets. However,
the illicit market is unique from those of regulated industries in that there is no
enforcement of property rights and organizations are able to compete for market
share through violence. This necessitates the inclusion of an additional input
into the model. Now, each organization is also able to select a level of military
capacity to invest in for use in the next period. This will be represented by γit ,
and can be thought of as encompassing all dimensions of violent conflict. It is
in essence the level of effort put towards violent competition in a given period.
An organization selecting a γit higher than that of its competitors is able to
increase its share of the market at the expense of others in the next period.
Now, a given organization’s market share is determined by:
Si∗ =

ηi +γit
P
(ηi +γit )+ N
j6=i (ηj +γjt )

This military expenditure is not cost-less. Without loss of generality, I will
assume that each unit of military expenditure is normalized at a cost of one and
that these expenditures cannot be negative. Further, since this investment must
be made in the period before its effect is realized, it is subject to the further
constraint that it must be less than the previous stage’s profit (for the sake of
the model’s simplicity, I will exclude the possibility of credit or inter-temporal
savings).
The organization’s profit function can now be represented as:
πit = (p − c)(a − bp)( (η

ηi +γit
PN

i +γit )+

j6=i (ηj +γit )

) − γit+1

If this market is to avoid both welfare-destroying price competition and
violent conflict, all organizations must coordinate both on price being set at
the monopoly level as well as on the sum of all military effort being zero. This
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scenario will maintain market shares at their original levels.
Given the nature of Bertrand price competition, there is no incentive for an
organization to deviate in both price and military expenditure. Deviation in
price negates the impact of a given organization’s market share as the deviating
organization will now have the lowest price and will command the entirety of
market profits. As such, I will assume collusion on the price dimension at the
monopoly price level and instead focus on an organization attempting to increase
its market share through military spending.
Baring in mind that the maximum a deviating firm is able to expend on
military investment is:

γit = πit−1 , and assuming collusion in the preceding

period and that all other organizations intend to continue colluding, the largest
possible market share that can be obtained by the deviating organization in the
current period is:
∗
Sit
=

ηi +πit−1
P
(ηi +πit−1 )+ N
j6=i ηj

Before investment in military capacity for the next period, this organization
∗
∗
m
will now have a profit of Πm
t (Sit ). This leaves a profit of Πt (Sjt ) ∀j 6= i to be

distributed among all other organizations. As in the preceding price collusion
scenario, when an organization deviates on price, it is expected that the other
organizations will retaliate in equal measure. Here, this would mean expending
the entirety of each organization’s profits from period t on military capacity
for period t + 1. Thus, in this grim trigger strategy:
PN

j6=i

∗
γjt+1 = Πm
t (1 − Sit )

And the resulting market share of organization i in period t + 1 would be
equal to:
∗
Sit+1
=

ηi +γit +γit+1
P
PN
(ηi +γit +γit+1 )+ N
j6=i (ηj )+
j6=i γjt+1

Where: γit = πit−1 and γit+1 = πit
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Collusion (avoiding the arms race of military expenditure) can only occur
when the following condition holds:
1
m
∗
m
∗
Πm
t−1 (Sit−1 )( 1−δi ) ≥ Πt (Si ) + δi Πt+1 (Sit+1 ) ∀i ∈ [1, ...., N ]

This expression is cleaned up by substituting

kit
k

for Sit , leaving the fol-

lowing simplified condition:
m
m
m
m
δi2 (Πm
t+1 kit+1 ) − δi (Πt+1 kit+1 − Πt kit ) − k(Πt−1 kit−1 ) ≥ Πt kit

The expression allows for δi to be isolated, providing an expression for the
minimum threshold level of δi at which an organization will choose to collude
in this environment. Taking the derivative of this threshold with respect to k
provides a comparative static that serves the crux of this study’s empirical basis
2

. In the context of the world that this model approximates, changes in k can

be caused by exogenous shocks that remove or add viable territory.
∂δi∗
∂k

= −√

kit−1 Πm
t−1
2
m2
m
m
m
2
m2
kit Πt −2kit+1 kit Πt+1 Πt −4kit−1 kit+1 kΠm
t+1 Πt−1 +5kit+1 Πt+1

Where δi∗ represents the lower threshold of organization i’s discount factor at
which collusion can occur.
This expression states that partial derivative of the threshold level of discount factor at which collusion on zero military expenditure is possible with
respect to the number of divisions of the market to be contested is negative.
Thus, as the number of blocks to be contested shrinks, the threshold discount
factor at which violence can be avoided increases.
We will assume that the discount rate, δi , is a random variable uniformly
distributed ∼ U [0, 1] among the N organizations. Let, F (δi ) be the cumulative
distribution function of these discount rates. As such, as the threshold level δi∗
increases, the probability that a given organization’s δi is below that threshold
increases.
2 The

entirety of these derivations are provided in the appendix
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Proposition: As the number of divisions in the market to competed for
decreases, collusion becomes less likely.
Proof: Through the model’s derivations above, δi∗ is decreasing in k. Thus,
for k∗ > k, F (δi∗ |k ∗ )N > F (δi∗ |k)N .
We are able to conclude, that the higher the threshold level of δi∗ , the less
likely we are to observe the δi values for all organizations being above that
threshold. Collusion grows less likely. In the case where violence is a means
of competition, this means that violence within the market grows more likely.
Making the assumption (as will be argued below) that the gentrification of a
viable drug block reduces k allows us an identification strategy by which to test
this model’s proposition.

3

Data

3.1

Description of Data

The majority of the data utilized in this study was made publicly available by
the City of Philadelphia through the OpenDataPhilly portal. Shapefiles representing the city’s Census Block Groups, Neighborhoods, and street corner
intersections were downloaded independently and mapped to one another. Further, the Philadelphia Police Department’s (PPD) crime incidents data set, the
city’s Department of Licensing and Inspections’ (DLI) building and zoning permits data set, and the city’s Office of Property Assessment’s (OPA) property
data set were all utilized. Data from the years 2010-2020 were made use3 .
The OPA property assessment data includes geocoded locations of each property and the date of that property’s last sale. Each property was mapped to its
3 Only the years 2011-2020 were actually made use of in the study, so as to limit the study
period to an even ten years. 2010 data was used solely for determining lags and deltas of
variables
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nearest street corner and is assigned as belonging to that block.
The DLI building and zoning permit data contains records of each permit
issued within the city. the permits consist of structural alterations, demolitions,
new construction, and change of zoning status permits. Each record has the
date of the permit’s issuance, it’s permit type, and the geocoded location of the
property that the permit pertains to. Each permit was mapped and assigned
to its closest matching city block.
The PPD crime incidents data contains incident dates, locations, and a
brief descriptor of the type of incident. Here, only those incidents described
as ”aggravated assault-firearm”, ”homicide- criminal”, and ”narcotic/ drug law
violations” were kept. The section on heterogeneous treatment effects found
later in this paper will go into greater detail regarding the drug incidents. Each
crime was mapped to its nearest block.
Summary statistics for these series are displayed in the table below.
Statistic
Number of Shootings
Number of Drug Crimes
Property Sales
Building, Zoning, and Alteration Permits

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

6027120
6027120
6027120
6027120

0.109
0.386
0.174
1.967

0.461
2.244
0.653
5.269

0
0
0
0

69
163
32
461

Table 1: Summary statistics for block level variables. Note that each observation
in the table is for an individual block.
From this block level data, I have built a directional spatial network. Each
block is linked to its 24 closest neighbors. This is roughly equivalent to a
two block radius surrounding each block. Block a0 s link to block b is one
observation, while block b0 s link to block a is a separate observation. In total,
this provides 602,712 unique linkages. The first node is referred to herein as the
”signal block”. The node it is linked to is referred to as the ”response block”.
Treatments will occur to signal block, while outcomes will be measured at the
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response block.
In total, I have indexed the data in linkage by year panels. There are 25,113
city blocks each linked to their 24 closest neighbors, charted over the course of
ten years, for a total of 6,027,120 observations. As such, the primary specifications of the models specified will have over 600,000 fixed effects. These fixed
effects will be able to capture any variation that could have been picked up by
the inclusion of covariates into the models. Further, at the fine level of resolution at which data is made use of in this study, reliable covariate data is not
available. Census data (ACS American Community Survey) to provide demographic controls is not available at this block level. Data for larger groupings
are unreliable and offered at lengthy intervals. Further, most of the event level
data provided by the City of Philadelphia that is able to be geocoded to specific
blocks is likely to be collinear to the data already made use of here.
It is of note that each year roughly fifty homicides occur in the City of
Philadelphia that are not firearm related. As such, as much as 3% of what
are here identified as shootings may be mislabeled. However, it is likely that
more shootings than this go unreported each year. The extent of this underreporting is unclear, as shootings without wounded victims may not attract
police attention when on average five people are shot in the city each day 4 .
Below is a charting on the total number of shootings in each year of this
study.
4 Per

the Philadelphia Inquirer
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Figure 1: “Total Shooting Incidents by Year”
It is evident that there was a large-scale increase in gun violence within the
city in 2020. While the results of this study do not seem to be unduly influenced
by 2020’s unprecedented high shooting total, the primary specification and its
disaggregation are replicated in the supplemental appendix with the year 2020
removed.
The crux of this study’s empirical strategy rests upon network link analysis,
estimating average changes that occur in one node when the link’s opposite
node is treated. To meet this purpose, a k-nearest neighbor adjacency matrix
was first constructed, tying each block to its 24 closest neighbors. This square
matrix has a length and a width equal to the total number of city blocks, and
each row and column indexes a particular block. Every cell in the matrix has
a value of zero, aside from those blocks that are among the set of k-nearest
neighbors to one another. Their intersections will have a value of one (while the
main diagonal, representing a block’s intersection with itself will have a value
of zero as well). For example, if block three and block four are neighbors, cell
(4,3) and cell (3,4) will have values of one while cells (4,4) and (3,3) will have
14

values of zero.
To generate the directional links, each coordinate pairing with a value of one
is taken as its own observation for each year. With this strategy, the average
treatment effect on linked blocks is able to be efficiently estimated.
The map below shows the locations of Philadelphia’s highest gun violence
areas. These are those blocks experiencing a k-neighbor shooting total greater
than three standard deviations above the city-wide mean. The locations of these
blocks are overlaid on a map of the city’s officially designated neighborhoods,
the boundaries of which are primarily the city’s main surface streets.

Figure 2: “Map depicting the city’s highest gun violence clusters: blocks with
neighbor shooting totals more than three standard deviations above the citywide mean”

3.2

Measuring Gentrification

First and foremost, there exists no overarching consensus regarding the method
by which gentrification should be identified quantitatively (Barton, 2014). Glaeser
et al. (2020) notes that there are nearly as many different measures of gentrification as there are papers written on the subject. Some of these different
definitions and measurements are discussed in Appendix A.
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Data limitations are the primary factor preventing the adoption of some
wide-spread empirical standard. Due to the unprecedented fine resolution at
which I am attempting to measure gentrification and its effects, none of the
established gentrification measures are feasible. Instead, I adopt an approach
to measurement adapted from that of Holms and Schulz (2017) and Glaeser
et al. (2020). The ”GentriMap” model of Holms and Schulz (2017) is a two
pronged approach to identifying gentrification, utilizing both real estate factors
(upgrades to properties and value changes) and social demographic factors as
identifying criteria. The approach of Glaeser et al. (2020) is similar. The
authors first identify neighborhoods that are capable of gentrifying, based on
poverty rates from the first five-year American Community Survey (ACS) to
occur in the window of their study. Next, to identify gentrification, the authors
track growth in home rental prices; with those that have above median rental
price growth rates being labeled as gentrifying.
The approach I utilize in this study identifies gentrification at its finest resolution, at the level of an individual city block. As in the above mentioned
approaches, the feasible set of blocks that are capable of gentrification are identified by demographic characteristics. Here, I make use of household income
levels from the 2011-2015 ACS for this purpose. The finest resolution that this
data is reliably available for is the Census Block Group 5 . As such, each city
block is mapped to the Census Block Group that encompasses it. Each block
that is located in a block group having an average household income level below
the city-wide median is labeled as having the potential to gentrify.
Of those blocks identified as having the potential to gentrify, the gentrification treatment is defined as beginning based upon real estate trends. Since
home sale and rental prices (or home valuations) are not easily available for
5 Census Blocks mentioned here are not the same as the city blocks utilized as the basic
level of observation in this study. Philadelphia has 384 Census Tracts, 1336 Census Block
Groups, 18872 Census Blocks, and 25,113 actual city blocks
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the area of study, I made use of home sales and building/renovation permits to
approximate the real estate component of gentrification. Spikes in home sales
are likely to be accompanied by rising costs. Helms (2003) provides justification
for the use of permitting data6 , finding that trends in building permit issuance
do in fact match the types and locations of properties that are predicted to
experience real estate interest brought on by gentrification.
To be labeled as gentrifying, the block in question must either have a change
from the previous year in the number of new construction or building alteration
permits issued that is more than three standard deviations above the city-wide
mean, have a change in the number of home sales that is greater than three
standard deviations above the city-wide mean, or have both a change in the
number of permits issued and a change in the number of home sales that each
exceed two standard deviations above the city-wide mean. The numerical values
of these classification criteria are summarized in the table below.
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Total

Conditions to be met in addition to below median household income condition
∆Sales>1 or ∆Permits>11 or (∆Sales>0 & ∆Permits>7)
∆Sales>1 or ∆Permits>11 or (∆Sales>1 & ∆Permits>7)
∆Sales>1 or ∆Permits>12 or (∆Sales>1 & ∆Permits>8)
∆Sales>1 or ∆Permits>13 or (∆Sales>1 & ∆Permits>8)
∆Sales>2 or ∆Permits>14 or (∆Sales>1 & ∆Permits>9)
∆Sales>2 or ∆Permits>15 or (∆Sales>1 & ∆Permits>10)
∆Sales>2 or ∆Permits>14 or (∆Sales>1 & ∆Permits>9)
∆Sales>2 or ∆Permits>15 or (∆Sales>1 & ∆Permits>10)
∆Sales>2 or ∆Permits>18 or (∆Sales>1 & ∆Permits>12)
∆Sales>2 or ∆Permits>17 or (∆Sales>1 & ∆Permits>11)

# newly meeting criteria
265
292
268
241
131
152
189
152
115
35
1840

Table 2: Criteria for Gentrification Classification
Utilizing changes in permitting and sales, rather than absolute numbers,
ensures that areas of longer term sustained real estate interest do not get mislabeled as newly gentrifying. The primary results of the study are replicated
with varying definitions of gentrification in the supplemental appendix. Once a
6 Using permitting data as a justification for gentrification implies a lagged effect on the
treatment, as there is undoubtedly a delay between a permit being issued and any sort of
residential demographic shifts. This is addressed in the treatment dynamics subsection of the
robustness checks portion of this paper. Further, the primary results are replicated with a
lagged treatment definition in the supplemental appendix.
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block is labeled as having begun the gentrification treatment, it maintains the
gentrification label for the remainder of the study. The map below displays the
locations of gentrifying blocks in the city.

Figure 3: “Map depicting blocks that gentrify during the period of the study”

Appendix C details an alternative gentrification measure where gentrification
is treated as a continuous variable.

4

Estimation Strategy

4.1

Primary Specification

To test the validity of the theoretical model’s prediction, a two-way fixed effect
differences-in-differences model is specified to identify the causal relationship
between gentrification and gun violence. City blocks gentrify independently of
one another across time. This provides an ideals setting from which to estimate
gentrification’s impact on violence.
This primary differences-in-differences specification is reported below.
18

shootingsit = βi + ψt + α1 Gentrif iedit + it

(1)

Where, i indexes block links, t indexes years, βi is a vector of block link
fixed effects, and ψt is a vector of year fixed effects.

4.2

Justification for Identification

The driving assumption behind this paper’s empirical strategy is that a block’s
gentrification makes that block no longer suitable for drug competition. There
are multiple potential rationales that would support this assumption. For one,
gentrification includes a turnover of residents and as such likely reduces the
original resident base that supported the illicit activity. Ellen, Horn & O’Regan
(2012) found that gentrified neighborhoods grow wealthier, more educated, exhibit higher rates of home ownership, and experience significant racial demographic changes. This can be inferred to represent a replacement of many of the
neighborhood’s original residents; thus making it more difficult for a criminal organization to find the level of community support necessary to operate openly.
Further, empirical evidence has demonstrated that gentrification leads to increased policing and the adoption of more punitive policing practices (Laniyonu,
2017). It is reasonable to believe that increases in policing would deter criminal activity, as famously predicted by Becker (1974). Regardless of the actual
mechanism at play, it is reasonable to assume that gentrification will make a
block less suitable for drug competition.
Further, to empirically test the validity of this identifying assumption, the
following difference-in-differences estimation model is specified and tested. This
specification seeks the causal impact of gentrification on the levels of drug crime
observed on a block following that block’s gentrification 7 . For this study’s iden7 This

specification mirrors the primary estimation strategy, for gentrification’s effect on
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tifying assumption to hold, the post-gentrification treatment coefficient should
be negative and significant.

Drugsit = βi + ψt + α1 Gentrif iedit + it

(2)

As is typical, i indexes individual block links, t indexes time periods, βi is
a vector of block link fixed effects, ψt is a vector of year fixed effects, it is an
error term, and α1 is the parameter of interest. Since these blocks are solely
linked to themselves in this specification, these block link fixed effects essentially
reduce to a vector of individual block fixed effects and the ensuing regression is
identical to a panel of 25,113 individual blocks across the ten year window. The
results of this specification are reported below. As the result demonstrates, there
is sufficient evidence to support the identifying assumption. Newly gentrified
blocks do not support the same level of drug trade post-gentrification as they
did pre-gentrification.
Dependent variable:
Immediate Block Drug Crimes
-0.218∗∗∗
(0.065)

Gentrification Indicator

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

0.39
6,027,120
0.56
22504829
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 3: Output from differences-in-differences estimation of gentrification’s
negative causal effect on immediate block drug crime.

The theoretical model predicts that the removal of viable territory from an
shootings, which will be analyzed in much greater detail.
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illegal market will increase the relative value of the remaining territory to be
competed for. I have provided evidence that gentrification reduces drug crime on
the immediate gentrified block, implying that this block has been removed from
the set of viable territory to be competed for. This is not necessarily enough to
completely tie the theoretical model to this empirical setting. It needs to be seen
that in the short run the gentrification of one block leads to increases in drug
crime on linked neighbor blocks. As such, I will limit the treatment variable
to it’s effect in the immediate period of treatment8 and replicate the same
specification with linked response block drug crime as the response variable.
Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Drug Crimes
0.06∗∗
(0.027)

Immediate Year Gentrification Indicator

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

0.38
6,027,120
0.56
22408438
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 4: Output from differences-in-differences estimation of gentrification’s
short run positive causal effect on neighboring block drug crime.

In the short run there is a clear increase in neighbor block drug crime following a block’s gentrification. When taken in conjunction with gentrification’s
effect on drug crime on the immediate block there is a clear suggestion that
gentrification pushes drug crime away from the immediate block and into the
surrounding neighborhood. This provides a sufficient justification for tying the
theoretical model to this empirical setting. Gentrification does reduce the k
8 This is done by replacing the Gentrification Indicator with a new indicator that is equal
to one if a given block is newly gentrified in that particular period.
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parameter, and as such should be associated with a decreased likelihood of cooperation across the illicit market and a measurable increase in gun violence.

5

Results

5.1

Primary Result

The results of fitting this primary empirical model to the data are reported below.9 Throughout this remainder of this study, I will focus most of my attention
to the OLS specification.
Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
OLS

Poisson

Negative Binomial

Log-Linear

Log IHS

0.02∗∗∗
(0.006)

0.04
(0.024)

0.02
(0.023)

0.009∗∗
(0.003)

0.012∗∗
(.004)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

X

0.11

0.11

0.11

0.066

0.085

6,027,120
0.16
-822808

6,027,120
0.16
2248264

Gentrification Indicator

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC

6,027,120
2,391,250
2,391,250
0.13
0.15
0.15
7512901
3390800
3338845
All Standard Errors Clustered at Census Block Group Level

∗
Note: R2 is squared correlation in Poisson and NegBin
p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Note: For log-linear, log(y)=log(y+1). Log IHS is log inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

Table 5: Output from primary differences-in-differences specification from various estimation methods
Gentrification has a positive effect on levels of gun violence observed in the
neighborhood surrounding the gentrified block. This result will be analyzed in
detail in the robustness section of this paper. First, though, I will examine
the heterogeneous treatment effect; disaggregating this observed effect into its
9 Estimation methods aimed at addressing the large amount of zeros in the data are reported
in the appendix.
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different component effects on high drug crime blocks and non-high drug crimes
blocks.

5.2
5.2.1

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
When High Drug Crime Blocks Gentrify

The theoretical model derived in Section 2 is specific in its setting. It provides
a prediction of the effect that changes in the total quantity of territory to be
competed over will have on aggregate levels of violence across an illegal market.
The empirical results, as reported thus far, are generalized to the entirety of the
city. Here, I analyze the heterogeneous treatment effects, providing evidence
that the treatment has a significantly stronger effect on those blocks that house
the illegal drug trade.
To begin, as mentioned previously, drug incidents from the same Philadelphia Police Department crime incidents database were mapped to their nearest
city block. These incidents were listed as ”narcotic/ drug law violations”. Those
blocks that had a number of incidents in the previous year that exceeded three
standard deviations above the city-wide mean were labeled as high drug crime
areas. Once labeled a drug block that block will maintain that label for the remainder of the study. Allowing for blocks to gain this label at later time periods
is meant to capture some of the dynamic nature of the movement of the drug
trade across the city. It is of note that the drug incident count that is being
made use of here is not a neighbor-based metric metric, as the shooting count
was. These are drug incidents occurring directly on that block. A map of the
location of these blocks is shown below.
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Figure 4: “Map depicting blocks designated as high drug crime areas during the
period of study”

The table below charts the number of drug blocks both initially identified
and gentrified in the city in each year. It is evident that drug blocks are both a
relative rarity in the city and that their gentrification is an even rarer occurrence.
Across the ten year window examined, the threshold for this classification is on
average at least seven drug incidents occurring on that block in a given year.
Year

Blocks Gentrified

New Blocks Labeled High Drug crime

Drug Blocks Gentrified

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Total

265
292
268
241
131
152
189
152
115
35
1, 840

282
0
71
62
34
35
42
49
29
50
654

23
24
21
23
5
13
7
13
10
4
143

Table 6: Counts of unique blocks labeled as gentrified or as drug blocks by year

With this drug block indicator, the primary difference in difference specification is able to be disaggregated into the treatment effect on non-drug blocks
24

and the effect on drug blocks.

shootingsit = βi + ψt + α1 N onDrugBlockGentrif iedit +
(3)
α2 DrugBlockGentrif iedit + it

Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
OLS

Poisson

Negative Binomial

Log-Linear

Log IHS

Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.12∗∗∗
(0.029)

0.18∗∗
(0.062)

0.16∗∗∗
(0.056)

0.052∗∗∗
(0.013)

0.068∗∗∗
(0.17)

Non-Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.01∗∗
(0.005)

0.02
(0.022)

0.004
(0.022)

0.006∗∗
(0.002)

0.008∗∗
(0.003)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

X

0.11

0.11

0.11

0.066

0.085

6,027,120
0.16
-823076

6,027,120
0.16
2247992

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC

6,027,120
2,391,250
2,391,250
0.13
0.15
0.15
7512571
3390748
3338813
All Standard Errors Clustered at Census Block Group Level

∗
Note: R2 is squared correlation in Poisson and NegBin
p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Note: For log-linear, log(y)=log(y+1). Log IHS is log inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

Table 7: Output from disaggregating difference and difference coefficient with
various estimation methods
As is evident in all specifications, the gentrification of a drug block has a
highly significant positive effect on the level of gun violence exhibited in the
surrounding neighborhood as predicted by the theoretical model. Further, it is
of note that the effect on drug blocks is consistently of a higher magnitude than
that on non-drug blocks. Focusing on the OLS results, the treatment effect is
more than ten times as large when it is a drug block that gentrifies. Testing
the equality of these two (OLS) coefficients returns a Wald Chi Square of 12.38,
with a corresponding p-value below 0.01. These two coefficients are significantly
different than one another.
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To further confirm this heterogeneous treatment effect, a differences-indifferences-in-differences (triple-difference) model is specified. A positive coefficient on the triple-difference estimator signifies that the effect on drug blocks
is of a greater magnitude than the overall treatment effect.

shootingsit = βi + ψt + α1 Gentrif iedit + α2 (Gentrif iedit · DrugBlocki ) + it
(4)
Where DrugBlocki is an indicator equal to one if the signal block is designated
as a drug block at any point during the study. α2 is the parameter of interest.
Dependent variable:
Neighbor Blocks Shootings
Gentrification Indicator

0.014∗∗
(0.005)

∗

0.10∗∗∗
(0.026)

Drug Block Gentrification Indicator∗

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

0.11
6,027,120
0.13
7512621
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 8: Staggered triple differences-in-differences estimator. Drug block gentrification is the parameter of interest

As is evident from the results table above, the triple-difference coefficient is
positive and significant. Gentrification has a statistically significantly different
effect on high drug crime blocks. This effect is of a greater magnitude, and is
able to explain some of the higher levels of violence observed on drug blocks.
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5.2.2

Gentrification’s Impact on Other Gentrified Blocks

Gentrification does not occur disparately across the city. As evidenced in the
map displayed earlier, gentrification tends to occur in clusters. The table below
shows, for the final year of this study (2020), the degree of clustering among
gentrified blocks. At the end of the study, there were 1,840 blocks recorded as
having gentrified. The table displays the frequency of a gentrified block having
a number of gentrified neighbors in its 2 block radius (k=24).
Range
0 to 5
6 to 10
11 to 15
16 to 20
21 to 24

Count
246
378
535
518
163

Table 9: Frequency of gentrified observations with a number of gentrified neighbors falling into a specific range

To examine the heterogeneous impact that gentrification has on other gentrified blocks versus non-gentrified blocks, the data is subset into linkages to
gentrified blocks and linkages to non-gentrified blocks. The primary model
specification was replicated on these two subsets.
Dependent variable:
Neighbor Blocks Shootings
(Gentrified Response Block Subset)

(Non-Gentrified Response Block Subset)

0.011
(0.010)

0.016∗∗
(0.005)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

X

0.245

0.103

Gentrification Indicator

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

292,231
5,734,889
0.13
0.13
601560
6799962
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

Table 10: Comparison
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p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

There is no effect observed on the gentrified response blocks. To verify
this, the primary regression specification is altered to allow the inclusion of an
indicator for whether the response block is gentrified and an interaction term
to capture the different effect that gentrification has on other gentrified blocks.
This new specification is displayed below.

shootingsit = βi + ψt + α1 Gentrif iedit + α2 Response Block Gentrif iedit
+α3 (Gentrif ied · Response Block Gentrif ied)it + it
(5)
Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
Gentrification Indicator

0.013∗∗
(0.005)

Response Block Gentrified Indicator

0.031∗∗∗
(0.007)

Interaction

0.011
(0.008)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

0.11
6,027,120
0.13
7512447
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 11: Regression to test whether the treatment effect is different for response
blocks that are themselves treated.
The insignificance of the interaction terms suggests that there is no difference in treatment effect between gentrified and non-gentrified response blocks.
This, taken in conjunction, with the previous regressions showing no significant
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treatment effect at all on gentrified response blocks, provides evidence that the
effect being captured in this paper’s primary regression specification is largely
occurring on non-gentrified blocks.

6

Robustness

6.1

Common Trends Assumption and Treatment Dynamics

Given that the empirical model makes use of a staggered treatment timing
difference and difference estimator, this estimator’s unbiasedness rests upon the
assumption of parallel trends in outcome between both control and treatment
groups (prior to those treatment blocks receiving their gentrification treatment).
Following the bulk of recent literature, an event-study plot is used to visually
demonstrate the average treatment effect at a number of periods before or after
treatment.
This plot is made my specifying the following regression model, adapted
from He and Wang (2017).

shootingsit =

k=9
X

k
Dit
· δk + γt + ψi + it

(6)

k=−9,k6=−1
k
Here, the coefficients of interest are δk . Dit
represents a vector of dummy

variables equal to one, if block i in period t is k periods away from gentrification. k = 0 in the initial treatment period. Further, as in He and Wang (2017)
omitted k = −1 so that post-treatment event study estimators are relative to
the period immediately before treatment.
The results are reported and plotted in the table and graphic below.
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Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
9 years before
8 years before
7 years before
6 years before
5 years before
4 years before
3 years before
2 years before
Treatment Period
1 year after
2 years after
3 years after
4 years after
5 years after
6 years after
7 years after
8 years after
9 years after
Block Level Fixed Effects

-0.03
-0.02
-0.02
-0.01
-0.004
-0.001
-0.01∗∗
-0.002
0.007 ∗
0.01∗∗
0.01∗∗
0.02∗∗∗
0.02∗∗∗
0.03∗∗∗
0.05∗∗∗
0.05∗∗∗
0.09∗∗∗
0.11∗∗∗
X

Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

(0.019)
(0.015)
(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.012)
(0.010)
(0.015)
(0.017)

X
6,027,120
0.13
7512078
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 12: Event study estimators of leads and lags of treatment effect

Figure 5: “Observed treatment effect by number of years pre or post treatment
”
Of the eight pre-treatment coefficients, only one is significant at the 95% con30

fidence level. This result is not dissimilar from those surveyed by Roth (2020).
However, the primary criteria by which the common trends assumption will be
tested is on is a joint-significance χ2 test. All of the pre-period coefficients will
be tested together against a null hypothesis of joint insignificance.
This test returns a Wald statistic of 1.41, which has a p-value of 0.18. As
such, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is not evidence that the
assumption of common trends is violated. Further evidence of this will be
provided from the results of falsification/ placebo tests later in this paper.

6.2

Differences-in-Differences Timing and Cohort Effects

Recent literature (Callaway and Sant’anna, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021) on
differences-in-differences methodology has shown us that the differences-in-differences
estimator is not always an ideal measure of the average treatment effect for
treated population (ATT) that it is aimed at estimating. As such, it is important to examine the cohort dynamics of treated units, when treatment occurs
at staggered intervals. Below are the cohort specific estimators, and the overall
ATT obtained using the Callaway and Sant’anna (2020) doubly robust estimator.
Overall ATT:
ATT
0.0218*
Group Effects:
Group
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Control Group:
Estimation Method:

Std Error
0.0046

ATT
Std Error
0.0380*
0.0097
0.0109
0.0106
0.0208
0.0077
0.0356*
0.0101
-0.0066
0.0115
-0.0070
0.0082
0.0400*
0.0108
0.0447
0.0160
0.0507
0.0439
Signif. codes: ‘*’ confidence
Never Treated
Doubly Robust

95% CI Lower Bound
0.0127

95% CI Upper Bound
0.0309

95% CI Lower Bound
0.0109
-0.0188
-0.0007
0.0075
-0.0389
-0.0300
0.0098
0.0000
-0.0721
band does not cover 0
Anticipation Periods:

95% CI Upper Bound
0.0650
0.0406
0.0424
0.0638
0.0257
0.0160
0.0702
0.0894
0.1735
0

Table 13: cohort level results from doubly robust Callaway Sant’anna estimator
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The graphic below, shows simple OLS cohort specific estimators obtained
using this study’s primary differences-in-differences specification. It is of note
that these estimators are largely consistent in magnitude. This balance implies
robustness of the overall estimator.

Figure 6: “Relatively consistent and positive estimators for each cohort ”

Goodman-Bacon (2021) explored the mechanics behind two-way fixed effects
difference-in-difference estimators such as the one utilized in the present study.
He demonstrates that the estimator can be decomposed into a weighted average
of all two-way difference-in-difference estimators that are able to be constructed
from the data. This determines the impact of variations in treatment timing
on the estimator. Decomposition of the estimator is able to show which units
are driving the estimator’s perceived effect, and whether the estimated effect
dissipates within treated units over time.
Here, Goodman-Bacon’s method, commonly referred to as “Bacon Decomposition”, will be used to explore the robustness of the primary result displayed
in the previous section. Decomposing that estimator yields the following result:
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Table 14: Bacon Decomposition of the primary DID estimator
Type
Weight Average Estimate
Earlier vs Later Treated 0.01047
0.00502
Later vs Always Treated 0.01095
-0.01393
Later vs Earlier Treated 0.01734
-0.01342
Treated vs Untreated
0.96124
0.02214

Figure 7: “Graphic depicting result from Bacon decomposition of primary DID
estimator, with DID estimator value (0.0209) as dashed line”
As is evident from these decomposition results, the effect is driven nearly
entirely by the difference between treated-vs-untreated units.

6.3

Falsification Tests

To test the validity of the treatment, several falsification tests are identified.
these tests consist of pushing the treatment date of treated units forward and
replicating the primary specification with this new placebo treatment indicator.
For the purpose of these tests, observations for the year 2020 were dropped as the
high outcome values for that year could unduly skew these falsification tests’
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results. These tests were replicated moving the gentrification treatment year
forward one, two, three, and four years forward each. Insignificant coefficients
imply that the placebo treatment is invalid, and give credence to the validity of
the actual treatment. These results are reported in the table below.
Dependent variable:
Number of Shootings
Minus One Year

Minus Two Years

Minus Three Years

Minus Four Years

0.007
(0.006)

0.006
(0.006)

0.002
(0.007)

0.004
(0.006)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

Gentrification Indicator Placebo

Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC

5,359,608
5,296,536
5,238,648
0.13
0.13
0.13
6187331
6073616
5844546
All Standard Errors Clustered at Census Block Group Level

Note:

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

5,186,592
0.13
5716283

p<0.01

Table 15: Output from falsification tests of primary differences-in-differences
specification
These falsification tests show no significance for the placebo dummy. As
such, they provide significant evidence that the gentrification treatment dummy
is properly located temporally. This provides more evidence of the validity of
the common trends assumption, and to the unbiasedness of the differences-indifferences estimator.

7

Discussion

This study has demonstrated a robust positive causal relationship between gentrification and gun violence. Following a block’s gentrification, there is a substantial increase in shootings in the surrounding neighborhood. The theoretical
model presented provides a potential mechanism behind some of these increases.
I have argued that due to a lack of enforceable territorial claims, competition
in illegal markets grows more violent with shocks to the total viable territory
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available and that gentrification serves as such a shock. However, this is not the
only mechanism behind gentrification’s role in spurring gun violence.
It is likely that gentrification forces intra-city migration. Residents are displaced from their long term homes, and forced into the remaining viable tracts
of affordable housing. These sorts of situations, where disaffected low-income
residents are forced to live in unfamiliar neighborhoods surrounded by similarly disaffected and displaced neighbors, have the potential to cause excessive
tension. That this can give rise to explosions in gun violence is not surprising.
Unfortunately, as is the major limitation in this study, data availability
makes empirical analysis of that potential mechanism near impossible. Reliable
data documenting the movement of urban residents across the city on an individual level is not readily available. Similarly, regularly updated demographic
data at the requisite granular block level is not easily accessible. This has prevented a more in-depth and formal analysis of what constitutes gentrification.
Further, computational limitations have prevented the examination of wider
spread impacts beyond the immediate neighborhood.
Despite these limitations, this study has presented a readily replicable measure of gentrification at an extremely fine resolution. Further, through leveraging a massive networked data set, I have been able to generate robust significant
estimates of the causal effect that gentrification has on levels of gun violence.
All of the coefficient’s estimated are of admittedly small magnitudes. However, when considering that each of these estimates is of the average causal effect
on the each single linkage between a newly gentrified block and its neighbor,
these numbers add up quickly to a startling total. Over the ten year window of
the study, back of the envelope calculations suggest that the city experienced
some 5,800 shootings that can be attributed to gentrification. This means, that
of the 27,000 shootings that occurred across the city during this time period,
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around 21% were spillover effects of gentrification.
Exploring the mechanism posited by this study’s theoretical model, the estimator was significantly higher. The gentrification of drug blocks accounted
for roughy 2,400 additional shootings during the ten year time span. This attributes some 8% of the city’s gun violence across the decade to gentrification
giving rise to instability in the city’s illicit drug markets.
These estimates are striking. Each episode of gun violence has the potential
to forever impact the lives of victims, perpetrators, families, and community
members at large. As such, in light of this unintended impact, it is crucial
that urban development occur responsibly and intentionally. Forced displacement, through pricing out residents, has very real effects on the surrounding
neighborhood.
Future research would do well to examine the natural limitations to where
illegal drug markets can feasibly exist. Models that are able to predict the
spatial movements of these markets across time can help to prevent these high
levels of violence from continuing. Further, the theoretical model developed in
this study should be expanded upon and tested empirically in other settings.

8
8.1

Appendix
Appendix A: Discussion of Other Gentrification Definitions

First and foremost, there exists no overarching consensus regarding the method
by which gentrification should be identified quantitatively (Barton, 2014). Authors have employed novel identification strategies, such as utilizing the number
of coffee shops in a given neighborhood

10

(Papachristos et al., 2011). Easton

10 Such a strategy would not be useful for a city such as Philadelphia which embodies a
striking divide between residential and commercial neighborhoods. As such, this method is
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et al. (2019) have stated that the difficulties in developing a quantitative identification strategy for gentrification is primarily a product of insufficient data.
They posit that gentrification is the displacement of lower income residents, and
that neighborhoods undergoing gentrification can be identified by demographic
changes, real estate trends, and survey data. However, the authors concede that
this sort of data is limited in its usefulness and may not necessarily capture all
of this sort of resident displacement.
Helms (2003) provides a thorough model of real estate dynamics as a product of gentrification. His model’s framework provides much of foundation on
which this study’s quantitative definition of gentrification rests. Using data from
Chicago to test his theoretical model, Helms (2003) finds that trends in building
permit issuing do in fact match the types and locations of properties that are
predicted to experience real estate interest brought on by gentrification. This
finding supports this study reliance on building/ renovation permit and home
sale data to serve as a marker of gentrification.
Holm and Schulz (2017) provide a robust statistical model for identifying
gentrification. As is typical of this literature, the authors concede that data
availability is the largest limitation to the quantitative identification of gentrification. Their ”GentriMap” model includes both real estate factors (upgrades
to properties and value changes) and social demographic factors as identifying
criteria.
This study embodies a similar approach to that of the ”GentriMap” model,
subject to the data limitations. Sales counts are used in place of value changes.
This proxy is a reasonable substitution, given data limitations. An increase
in sales reflects an increase in demand which in turn should imply an increase
in property valuations. Permit data is used in the same manner as in other
gentrification models. Median household incomes are utilized as a demographic
not replicated in this study
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factor indicative of a block’s ability to become gentrified -as most definitions
agree that low income household displacement is a necessary condition.
Several other recent papers have put forth measurements of gentrification.
Dragan et al. (2019) made use of 5-year ACS data at the Census Tract level (the
third smallest level of Census data aggregation) to identify potentially gentrifying blocks based in part on changes in demographic characteristics captured by
these surveys. This data was augmented by administrative data identifying the
addresses of individuals, to track their movement across the city over the study
period. Ellen et al. (2019) confidential census data to identify household demographic characteristics and residency, to track high-income movements into
the city that are associated with gentrification. This analysis takes place at the
Census Tract level.
Autor et al. (2017) use spatial exposure to the buildings that end their
rent control status as a measure of gentrification. This is done on the basis of
some literature the authors cite, that establish the abatement of rent control
as being associated with numerous changes in neighbor housing stock quality
and pricing. Glaeser et al. (2020) puts forth both a continuous and a binary
gentrification measure, built on 5 year ACS survey data and rental price data.
That analysis is conducted at the zip-code level.
As is evident, this study is not alone in offering forth an empirical measure of
gentrification. Nor is the measurement strategy utilized herein disparate from
that utilized in the bulk of the literature. However, this study differs in that it
measures gentrification at the finest resolution availble, while using solely open
access freely available data.
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8.2

Appendix B: Continuous Definition of Gentrification

It is worth briefly examining a potential continuous measure of gentrification,
in which gentrification exists on a spectrum. More real estate interest on more
impoverished blocks leads to higher values on this spectrum, while less interest
of wealthier blocks leads to lower values.
The real estate component is represented by the following index.

Real Estate Index =

1
N

∆permitsit
it
( ∆sales
)
¯ t + ∆permits
¯
∆sales
t
PN ∆salesit
∆permitsit
· i=1 ( ∆sales
)
¯ t + ∆permits
¯
t

(7)

This index value is block specific. It is then multiplied by its constituent
Census Block Group’s poverty rate to provide a simple continuous measure of
gentrification.

Gentrif ication Index = Real Estate Index · P overty Rate

(8)

Replacing the binary gentrification treatment indicator from the initial specification with this continuous measure yields the following results.

shootingsit = βi + ψt + α1 Gentrif ication Indexit + it

(9)

This measure has a mean of 0.032, a standard deviation of 1.05, and ranges from
-10.07 to 9.3. Higher values are associated with higher degrees of gentrification.
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Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
0.0007∗∗
(0.0003)

Continuous Gentrification Measure

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean

0.11

Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

6,027,120
0.13
7512447
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 16: Continuous model of gentrification’s effect

8.3

Appendix C: Addressing Non-standard Distribution
of Shootings

As is to be expected, the distribution of shootings is heavily clustered at zero.
The vast majority of blocks and linkages do not experience any shootings. Typically, this is addressed with with a Tobit model. However, due to the large
number of fixed effects used in the empirical model, this is extremely computationally costly and not feasible. This sort of estimation would rely on specialty
atypical maximization routines that would still provide inconsistent estimations
of the variance (Henningsen, 2020).
As such, a random effects Tobit model is specified here, the results of which
are reported in the table below

40

Dependent variable:
Number of Shootings
Gentrification Indicator

0.11∗∗∗
(0.0008)

Log Sigma Mu

-0.62∗∗∗
(0.0007)

Log Sigma Nu

-0.78∗∗∗
(0.00002)

Block Level Random Effects

X

Year Random Effects

X

Mean
Observations
Log Liklihood
Standard Errors

0.11
6,027,120
9419719
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 17: Random Effects Tobit Model
The disaggregation of this coefficient, as shown earlier with OLS estimators
in the heterogeneous treatment effects section, is displayed below.
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Dependent variable:
Number of Shootings
Drug Block Gentrification

0.40∗∗∗
(0.003)

Non-Drug Block Gentrification

0.08∗∗∗
(0.0009)

Log Sigma Mu

-0.62∗∗∗
(0.0007)

Log Sigma Nu

-0.78∗∗∗
(0.00002)

Block Level Random Effects

X

Year Random Effects

X

Mean

0.11

Observations
Log Liklihood
Standard Errors

6,027,120
9419083
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 18: Random Effects Tobit Model- disaggregation of primary treatment
estimator
Now, addressing the fixed effects issue, a hurdle model is approximated. This
will provide two separate estimators: one, a logit estimator of the probability of
the shooting outcome variable being equal to zero and the other a differencesin-differences OLS estimator ran solely on the subset of the data in which the
number of shootings is greater than zero.
As above, the disaggregated coefficient is reported as well.
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Dependent variable:
Pr(Number of Shootings>0)

Number Shootings When Number of Shootings>0

Logit

OLS

0.017
(0.028)

0.06∗∗∗
(0.022)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

X

0.08

1.37

Gentrification Indicator

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC

2,391,250
0.12
2627291
All Standard Errors Clustered at Census Block Group Level

Note: Logit Adjusted R2 is Squared Correlation

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

483,363
0.14
1548094

p<0.01

Table 19: Output from replicating primary difference and difference specification
with hurdle approximation

Dependent variable:
Pr(Number of Shootings>0)

Number Shootings When Number of Shootings>0

Logit

OLS

Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.18∗∗∗
(0.068)

0.19∗∗
(0.060)

Non-Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

-0.001
(0.027)

0.04∗
(0.022)

X

X

Block Level Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC

X

X

0.08

1.37

2,391,250
0.12
2627269
All Standard Errors Clustered at Census Block Group Level

Note: Logit Adjusted R2 is Squared Correlation

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

483,363
0.14
1548063

p<0.01

Table 20: Output from disaggregating difference and difference coefficient with
hurdle approximation
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11.1
11.1.1

Supplemental Appendix
Alternate Specifications
Drug Block Definition

Here, the definition of a high drug crime block is altered. Now, blocks with a
number of drug incidents that is greater than two standard deviations above
the city wide mean are labeled as high drug crime blocks.
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Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.10∗∗∗
(0.023)

Non-Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.01∗
(0.005)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

0.11
6,027,120
0.13
7512461
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parenthese

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 21: Output from disaggregation of the primary specification differencesin-differences estimator with drug block classification standard lowered

11.1.2

Gentrification Treatment Definition

Here, the definition of the gentrification treatment is altered. The demographic
classification criteria remains the same, but the real estate component is changed.
Now, to be labeled as gentrifying, the block in question must either have a
change from the previous year in the number of new construction or building
alteration permits issued that is more than two standard deviations above the
city-wide mean, have a change in the number of home sales that is greater than
two standard deviations above the city-wide mean, or have both a change in the
number of permits issued and a change in the number of home sales that each
exceed one standard deviation above the city-wide mean.
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Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
0.02∗∗∗
(0.005)

Gentrification Indicator

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

0.11
6,027,120
0.13
7512830
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard error in parentheses

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 22: Main differences-in-differences specification with classification standard lowered

Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.12∗∗∗
(0.028)

Non-Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.09∗
(0.004)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

0.11
6,027,120
0.13
7512359
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 23: Output from disaggregation of the primary specification differencesin-differences estimator with gentrification classification standard lowered

11.1.3

Drug Block and Gentrification Definitions

Here, both gentrification and drug block classification standards are lowered in
the manner described previously.
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Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.10∗∗∗
(0.022)

Non-Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.01∗∗∗
(0.004)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean

0.11

Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

6,027,120
0.13
7512211
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 24: Output from disaggregation of the primary specification differencesin-differences estimator with both gentrification and drug block classification
standards lowered

11.1.4

Removing Year 2020 Observations

Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
0.009∗
(0.005)

Gentrification Indicator

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

0.10
5,424,408
0.13
6372697
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 25: Main differences-in-differences specification with year 2020 observations removed.
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Dependent variable:
Neighbor Block Shootings
Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.07∗∗∗
(0.02)

Non-Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.004
(0.005)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

Mean

0.10

Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Errors

5,424,408
0.13
6372557
Clustered at Census Block Group Level
∗

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 26: Output from disaggregation of the primary specification differencesin-differences estimator with year 2020 observations removed.

11.2

Alternate Clustering of Standard Errors
Dependent variable:
Neighbor Blocks Shootings
0.02∗
(0.01)

0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.02∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.02
(0.013)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

0.11

0.11

0.11

0.11

6,027,120
0.13
7512901
Police District

6,027,120
0.13
7512901
Block

6,027,120
0.13
7512901
Block Link

6,027,120
0.13
7512901
None

Gentrification Indicator

Mean
Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Error Clustering
Note:

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 27: Output from primary difference and difference specification with various levels of standard error clustering
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Dependent variable:
Number of Neighbor Blocks Shootings
Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.12∗∗
(0.050)

0.12∗∗
(0.003)

0.12∗∗∗
(0.011)

0.12∗∗
(0.047)

Non-Drug Block Gentrification Indicator

0.01
(0.009)

0.01∗∗∗
(0.016)

0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.01
(0.011)

Block Level Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

6,027,120
0.13
7512571
Police District

6,027,120
0.13
7512571
Block

6,027,120
0.13
7512571
Block Link

6,027,120
0.13
7512571
None

Observations
Adjusted R2
AIC
Standard Error Clustering
Note:

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 28: Output from disaggregating difference and difference coefficient with
various levels of standard error clustering
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